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U.S. ASYLUM POLICY AND THE NEW WORLD ORDER
. Vernon M. Briggs, Jr
As with most nations of the First
World, refugee and asylee policies did
not emerge as formal components of
the immigration system of the United
States until after World War II. Ini-
tially, refugee policy was designed as
an ad hoc response to the problem of
displaced persons in Europe. But with
the advent of the Iron Curtain in
Eastern Europe and the fall of the
Nationalist government in China all
within four years following the end of
that war, the emergence of refugee
policy was quickly engulfed by the
political posturing associated with the
East-West struggle between the free
world and the communist world. I
Despite its humanitarian implications,
it became a foreign policy tactic to be
manipulated in the context of the Cold
War political struggle.
It was not until 1980 that the
United States formally adopted an
asylee policy in legislative forum.
When it did, it too became ensnarled
in the Cold War political conundrum
that perverted its idealistic and
humanitarian intentions.
With the dismantlement of the
Berlin Wall in 1989 and the subse--
quent breakup of the Soviet Union in
1991, however, the dynamics of refu-
gee and asylee issues have been radi-
cally altered. In the new world order,
differences in political ideology have
given way to differences in economic
conditions between nation states as the
prompting force for the outflow of
would-be refugees and asylum seekers.
In part, these pressures are associated
with the political disintegration of the
poorer republics of the former Soviet
Union and its former satellite. nations
into ethnic enclaves. But the most
endemic of the new contributory pres-
sures are emanating from North-South
economic differences between the
'have' and 'have-not' nations. Refugee
and asylee pressures are increasingly
being linked with the broader world-
wide issues of population growth,
unbalanced economic dev~lopment,
and migration pressures.
In many countries of the Third
World, the causes of their govern-
mental instability are as much social as
they are political. The rapid rate of
population growth is a persistent and
negative influence on efforts to stimu-
late economic development. Population
growth is often the source of political
turmoil and violence in these countries
because it is linked to ancillary prob-
lems of health, housing, education,
nutrition, and land use. As long as the
population growth issue is unad-
dressed, emigration becomes an ever
appealing option. But to do this, the
would-be emigrants must find a way to
gain access to a First World nation.
Political asylum policy, although not
intended to do so, has increasingly
become the means to accomplish this
purpose.
THE CREATION OF
AN ASYLUMPOLICY
Since the United States first enacted an
asylum policy, persons who actually
arrive on the shores of the United
States and who, at the time of entry,
say that they have been persecuted or
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that they have 'a well-founded fear' of
being persecuted if they return home
on anyone of five grounds specified in
the Act, may make a claim for politi-
cal asylum.2 If a subsequent hearing
conducted by the Immigration and
Nationalization Service (LN .S.) on the
merits of the case leads an examiner to
support the claim, the individual may
remain in the United States and, even-
tually, be able to adjust his or her
status to that of a permanent resident
alien and, after five years, become a
naturalized citizen.
If the applicant receives a negative
decision at the hearing level, it may be
appealed at the administrative level
and, subsequently, through the entire
appeals procedures of the nation's
judicial system. The protracted process
can take years to reach a conclusion.
As for the unsuccessful applicant who
receives a negative decision at any
point, he or she may decide simply to
'disappear' into the ranks of the
nation's illegal immigrant population.
The vast majority of asylum seekers of
the 1990s have chosen this last
alternative.
THE ISSUE OF MASS ASYLUM
Little thought was given to the long
term implications of asylum policy
when it was added to the U.S. immi-
gration system by the Refugee Act of
1980. It was anticipated that asylum
would be used by individuals who
were political dissidents or defectors
from totalitarian regimes and who
somehow were able to make it to U.S.
soil.
The 'MarieI' Experience: It was
simply not foreseen that the United
States would ever become a nation of
'first instance' for the mass arrival of
asylee applicants. But this is precisely
what happened within only weeks of
its enactment. The 'Mariel boatlift'
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experience in the Spring of 1980 wit-
nessed 130,000 persons from Cuba
and Haiti arriving in the United States
within a two month period and re-
questing political asylum. Not wishing
to set a precedent, the Carter Adminis-
tration refused to grant blanket asylum
to all of those who arrived. It did,
however, initiate a process for review-
ing each case individually. Ultimately,
the eligibility issue was rendered moot
when the subsequently enacted Immi-
gration Reform and Control Act of
1986 granted an amnesty to all of
these persons if they applied for such
adjustment of status. Expediency took
precedent over principle. 3
When the Reagan Administration
took office in 1981, it initiated two
major steps to avoid any replication of
the mass asylum experience. During
the presidential campaign, it had used
the entire 'Mariel Boatlift' experience
as an indictment of the inability of the
Carter Administration to properly
govern the country. Accordingly, the
Reagan Administration adopted a
policy of intercepting boats with such
human cargoes on the high seas and
returning them, if possible, to their
original ports. A treaty was actually
signed by the United States and Haiti
in 1981 whereby Haiti agreed to take
back such persons without penalty. It
was also announced that any mass
arrivals that did occur would result in
the persons aboard such vessels being
placed in detention camps.
In the years that followed, this
policy was tested as individuals and
groups continued, on a sporadic basis
to flee by sea from Haiti and Cuba.
But their treatment was not equal.
Haitian boats were turned around;
Cuba boats brought ashore. Likewise,
persons who somehow avoided inter-
diction and who arrived from Cuba
(by whatever means) were given
refugee status almost automatically
while Haitians were often put into
detention or deported. Given the Cold
War dynamics of the 1980's, the
Cubans (leaving a communist govern-
ment) were viewed as fleeing their
homeland for political reasons; the
Haitians (fleeing a right wing dictator-
ship) were usually considered to be
fleeing for economic reasons. Charges
of differential treatment in the admin-
istration of the law were vigorously
denied and such charges were not
sustained by a subsequent U.S.
Supreme Court ruling.4
The Central America Debacle: Mean-
while, the Reagan Administration took
counter productive steps when it politi-
cized its human rights position in
Central America during the 1980s.5
Persons who fled from a civil war in
Nicaragua (with a 'socialist' govern-
ment) and sought political asylum were
perfunctorily approved; those fleeing
from 'death squads' and guerilla fight-
ing in El Salvador and Guatemala
(with right-wing governments) had
their asylum applications rejected
almost routinely.6 Charges of misappli-
cation of the law not only spawned a
grass-roots protest movement (i.e., the
'Sanctuary movement') but, ultimately,
led the U.S. Department of Justice to
concede the validity of the charge in
an out-of-court settlement in 1990 of a
class action suit that the government
knew it would lose.7 The settlement
required that hearings had to be of-
fered to 350,000 persons from El
Salvador and Guatemala who, it was
alleged, did not file for asylum during
the 1980s because they may have felt
that the procedures were stacked
against them. Another 150,000 cases
were required to be re-opened where
similar individuals from these two
countries had been ruled to be illegal
aliens.
The Haitian Saga: When the Cold
War abruptly and unexpectantly ended,
efforts by the Bush Administration to
establish a coherent policy to address
mass asylum situations reverted back
to the principle of deterrence like that
which the Reagan Administration had
first enunciated.
The first test of the Bush policy
came when the duly elected govern-
ment of Haiti headed by Jean-Bertrand
Aristide was over thrown by a military
coup on 30 September 1991. In pro-
test, the United States and other count-
ries in the region imposed a trade and
oil embargo with Haiti. By the end of
October 1991, a number of ships from
Haiti filled to capacity with human
beings, were intercepted in inter-
national waters by the U.S. Coast
Guard. Initially, the Haitians were
taken aboard the Coast Guard's ships
and simply held there. As their num-
bers increased, more Coast Guard
cutters were sent to the area. The
policy of routinely returning Haitians
was temporarily suspended in light of
the uncertain political conditions on
Haiti. Interviews, however, were con-
ducted by immigration officials on the
ships to ascertain whether any such
persons had a possible claim for politi-
cal asylum.
The Bush Administration, however,
considered most of those picked up at
sea to be fleeing the deteriorating
economic conditions on Haiti, not
political persecution per se. Moreover,
the Administration feared that, if those
picked up at sea were all taken to the
U.S. mainland, it would trigger a mass
exodus of persons from the island on
only marginally seaworthy ships. It
was thought likely that many would
perish in the attempt.
Meanwhile, the Administration
sought a regional solution while nego-
tiations continued for the return of
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Aristide to power. Working with the
United Nations High Commissioner
for Refugees, efforts were made to see
if other regional nations would agree
to provide a temporary safe haven for
the Haitians held on U.S. ships. For
the most part these efforts failed. The
Bahamas and the Dominican Republic
declined such requests. Honduras,
Venezuela, Belize, Trinidad, and
Tobago agreed to participate but, in
total, they indicated that they would
only take 550 Haitians.
By mid-November 1991, there
were 2,200 Haitians in custody and all
of the available cutters were at capa-
city. It was decided, therefore, to
begin a repatriation of those screened
aboard those ships who were deemed
not to have a valid claim for asylum
and to take the remainder to aU. S.
naval station located at Guantanamo
Bay, Cuba. There they would be given
temporary safe haven and the screen-
ing process could be completed for
those not yet interviewed.
Hardly had the repatriation process
began on 19 November 1991 than it
was enjoined from continuing on the
next day by a court order issued by a
district judge in Miami. He held that
repatriation should not continue while
the issue of the legality of interdiction
itself was being challenged in the
courts by refugee advocate groupS.8
The judge held that the 'threatened
injury' (i.e., to the Haitians) of their
return 'outweighs the potential harm
that an injunction would cause the
defendants' (i.e., the U.S. govern-
ment). The judge, however, did not
order that the Haitians on the ships or
those living at the new tent city that
had been hastily constructed at
Guantanamo Bay be brought to the
U.S. mainland. The decision was
appealed by the federal government.
On 31 January 1992 the U.S. Supreme
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Court, by a 6-3 vote, lifted the injunc-
tion issued by the district court al-
though it gave no written reason for its
action.9 The decision, while permitting
the repatriation process to be renewed,
allowed the actual legal challenge of
the interdiction process to continue to
work its way through the nation's
judicial system.
By this time, there were about
10,000 Haitians at the naval base and
another 1,500 were still aboard a
Naval troop ship and Coast Guard
cutters anchored off shore. On 3
February 1992, the process of
repatriation commenced. In total,
about 14,000 Haitians had been in-
volved in this since it began in late
October, 1991. Of this number, about
1,400 Haitians had been found during
the screening process to have a plaus-
ible case for asylum and had been
transported to Miami to formally make
their case. Another 2,000 Haitians at
the naval base had also been deter-
mined to be eligible to make a formal
asylum application and were awaiting
transfer to Miami. Another 350
Haitians had been transferred to the
other regional countries that had
agreed to provide temporary safe
haven for them.
As for the interdiction process, it
continued to be in effect. Additional
boats were intercepted and the new
detainees were brought to Guantamno.
On 24 May 1992, however, President
Bush issued an Executive Order that
formally ended the process of taking
Haitians picked up at sea to
Guantanamo and initiated a process
whereby all subsequent Haitians
picked-up would be returned directly
to Haiti without giving them the
chance to appeal for safe protection or
asylum. Such persons were instructed
to take their requests directly to the
U.S. Embassy in Haiti. When
questioned about the efficacy of this
action a few days later, President Bush
stated 'I will not, because I have
sworn to uphold the Constitution, open
the doors to economic refugees from
all over the world. We cannot do
that. ,10 The U.S. Supreme Court up-
held the Bush policy of direct return in
August, 1992. By then, over 37,000
Haitians had been picked up at sea by
the interdiction process.
The fmal closing of the tent city at
Guantamano, however, was compli-
cated by the fact that about 10 per cent
of the Haitians who had been found to
have a legitimate basis on which to
make an asylum request on the main-
land were diagnosed as having the
H.1.V. virus that causes AIDS. Under
existing immigration law, such persons
are not permitted to enter the United
States regardless of circumstance.
These individuals, therefore, remained
in a legal state of limbo until a federal
district court in New York City in
early June, 1993 ordered their release
and their admission to the United
States thereby ending the use of the
naval base as a detainment center. II
The Clinton Administration chose not
to appeal the order so these Haitians
were flown to the United States a few
days later.
On 21 June 1993, the U.S.
Supreme Court issued its opinion on
the legality of the interdiction policy.
The court, by an 8 to 1 vote, upheld
the policy of intercepting Haitian 'boat
people' in international waters and re-
turning them to their homeland. The
court stated that 'we are not persuaded
that either one (i.e., U.S. immigration
law or U.S. duties under international
refugee treaties) places any limit on
the president's authority to repatriate
aliens interdicted beyond the territorial
waters of the United States.'12
The Chinese Dilemma: Roughly
paralleling the same time span that the
Haitian drama was being played out, a
new fonn of mass asylum was taking
place on the West Coast of the United
States. Large freighter ships were
found to be transporting human beings
from the People's Republic of China
to the United States. Initially, these
ships were met by smaller boats or
yachts several miles off shore where
the people were transferred and
brought ashore in a clandestine man-
ner. It was essentially a process to
smuggle illegal aliens into the country.
Typically these persons had paid large
sums for this service and were obli-
gated upon arrival to work-off these
sums under terms of virtual bondage in
Chinese-owned business enterprises.
How many such drop-offs have occur-
red is, of course, unknown. But when
boats were intercepted by the Coast
Guard and the people brought ashore,
they typically requested political asy-
lum and usually were released.13 In
most instances, they simply disap-
peared into the large illegal immi-
gration population of the Chinatowns
of San Francisco, Los Angeles, and
New York City. From 1991 to mid-
1993, twenty-two boats and freighters
were intercepted by the U.S. Coast
Guard. What appeared to be isolated
events were soon recognized as being
an organized and on-going phenomena.
The issue received national attention
when in early June 1993 another ship
with over 300 Chinese persons aboard
ran aground on a beach near New
York City. Those aboard were forced
to jump into the water and eight died.
The others were rescued but, as they
came ashore, they all asked for politi-
cal asylum. Unlike those caught on the
West Coast, these persons were put
into detention camps (at least for the
time being). In early July 1993, three
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more small freighters crammed with
over 600 persons from China were
intercepted in international waters
south of San Diego, California. Pre-
vented from entering U.S. territorial
waters, the government of Mexico -
after much coaxing from the U.S.
government
-
agreed to allow the
ships to be escorted to its waters
where it would then allow the ships to
dock; it would immediately transport
those aboard to the airport at
Ensenada; and they would be flown
directly back to China.14 In explaining
the willingness to perform this task, an
ofticial of the Mexican government
explained: 'We know very well that
none of these people who are coming
here are being persecuted. The U.S.
knows that, too. The only difference is
that in the United States the only thing
you have to do is to step on American
soil and cry asylum and you get a
hearing. '15
Indeed, U.S. asylum policy has
been roundly criticized for actually
encouraging people from China to
abuse its terms because of the liberal
way it has been implemented. In
November 1991 the Bush Administra-
tion issued a directive that expanded
the definition of political asylum to
include anyone adversely affected by
any kind of forced family planning.
Since that time, most asylum seekers
from China arriving on the U.S. main-
land have been granted political asy-
lum. In 1992 their sucess rate was 85
per cent (three times the rate of asy-
lum seekers from other countries). It is
also acknowledged that those who are
unsuccessful in this application simply
vanish into the illegal immigrant com-
munities of urban Chinatowns.
Asylum Requests at Airports:
Although it has been the mass asylum
issues involving Haitians and Chinese
that have gained prominence in both
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the courts and the media of the United
States, a far more insidious trend in
asylum requests has slowly emerged in
the 19908. This has been the gradual
accumulation of individual requests for
asylum, largely from persons from
Third World countries, at the nation's
ports of entry. The situation involves
individuals who show up at border
entry points - usually airports - with
false documents, or stolen documents,
or, increasingly, no documents at all
but who claim they will be killed or
tortured if they are returned home,I7
By 1993, their numbers were averag-
ing almost 10,000 persons a month. In
the overwhelming number of situa-
tions, the individuals are released
because there is no available detention
space locally available to hold them.
Under prevailing procedures, if a
person arrives at such an entry point
and makes a request for asylum, the
individual is entitled to a protracted
legal process to determine the validity
of the claims. As one frustrated
immigration ofticial said in 1993, 'it is
so easy to defeat the system that a 10
year-old kid could do it.' 18
PENDING POLICY REFORMS
Amidst a backlog of almost 300,000
political asylum applications as of mid-
1993, public hearings have been held
by the relevant congressional commit-
tees responsible for the design of
immigration policy. A number of
legislative proposals have been
drafted. Although the outcome of these
efforts is unknown as of this writing, it
is useful to at least mention some of
the key provisions under consideration.
One proposal would establish pre-
inspection screening stations to be
staffed by I.N .S. officials in several
foreign airports that have a high vol-
ume of U.S.-bound air traffic. These
officials would have the authority to
examine travel documents for their
authenticity and to assure that all
persons on board possess such docu-
ments before departure to the United
States. There is no legal barrier to stop
the I.N.S. from doing this now if the
appropriate permissions can be negoti-
ated with the designated countries. It
would, however, require additional
funds and the I.N .S. has been a tradi-
tionally under funded agency relative
to its duties. Moreover, I.N.S. offi-
cials feel that pre-inspection will be a
costly procedure and that it is unlikely
to have much effect. They feel that
asylum abusers will simply shift their
departures to airports in other count-
ries where pre-inspection stations do
not exist.
Another proposal would grant
immigration officials at U.S. airports
the authority for summary exclusion of
anyone arriving at any airport without
a document or with stolen or forged
documents. Such persons would be
immediately returned to the country
from where they came. Their only
chance to make an appeal for asylum
would be if they could convince the
immigration officer at the time of
entry that they have a credible fear of
persecution.
Still another proposal would re-
quire each applicant for political asy-
lum first to obtain 'non-refoulement'
status (i.e. official acknowledgment
that he or she would be in danger if
sent back to the home country). To do
so, the applicant would have to give
notice within seven days of arriving in
the United States and file within 30
days an application for such status.
The individual would then have to
appear before a member of a specially
trained corps of non-refoulement offic-
ers who would be required to issue a
decision with seventy-five days. Only
one appeal on the merits of the claim
would be permitted. It is not clear,
however, how this procedure would
cope with the problem of the large
number of persons who vanish as
illegal immigrants once they are in the
country or during the procedural
stages of the appeal process. There is
no mention of any plan to keep such
individuals at detention centers while
the procedures are being implemented.
On 27 July 1993, President Clinton
offered his Administration's proposals
to address the problem of asylum
abuse. He linked his efforts to the
issue of illegal immigration as well as
to the fact that political asylum had
been used as a means for terrorists to
enter the country for nefarious pur-
poses. He said that the changes he
proposed are intended to address 'the
kinds of practices that are manifest in
who can get into this country on an
airplane, what kinds of smuggling (of
human beings) can go on, and the fact
that our borders leak like a sieve:
those things cannot be permitted to
continue in good conscience. ,19Among
his proposals is a call for new proced-
ures for on-the-spot administrative
hearings to determine whether immi-
grants seeking political asylum at a
port of entry have legitimate claims.
An I.N.S. official, specially trained in
asylum issues, would determine at the
port of entry whether the individual
applicant had 'a credible fear of perse-
cution' if returned to his or her home-
land. Those with a valid claim would
be given protection and allowed to
pursue their claim at a later formal
hearing. Those whose claims are not
upheld would be given the opportunity
to make one appeal to other officials
of the U.S. Department of Justice. If
the appeal is denied, they would be
immediately deported. During the
appeals procedure, the applicant would
be held in detention. If the appeal is
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upheld, the applicant will presumably
be freed until a formal hearing on the
individual's request can be scheduled.
The Clinton plan also calls for use of
the pre-inspection of documents pro-
gram at foreign airports (but presum-
ably not in every country where U.S.
bound planes originate).
Whether any or all of the pending
reforms or other proposals are adopted
and, more importantly, whether they
will be effective remains to be demon-
strated. It is an uncontested fact, how-
ever, that the present political asylum
system is being massively abused. It is
providing a new entry channel for
illegal entry.
CONCLUDINGOBSERVAnONS
With the end of the Cold War, the
issues of population growth, human
migration, and refugee accommodation
are converging. Unable to qualify for
admission as legal immigrants (because
such entry is largely restricted to
persons with family ties to citizens or
who have needed occupational skills),
the refugee system provides a means
of access for many persons wishing to
flee the poverty, unemployment and
destitution of their homeland. Asylum
policy is the most vulnerable element
of refugee policy for exploitation. To
alleviate the economic forces that lie at
the core of the asylum abuse dilemma
will require more fundamental policies
than the procedural changes currently
under consideration by Congress or
those proposed by President Clintion.
Among these must be policies that
promote family planning and provide
the means for its practice; expand
commitments to economic develop-
ment assistance; and link trade access
to the U.S. marketplace and the re-
ceipt of foreign aid to the strict adher-
ence to internationally specified human
right practices.
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New refugee and asylum policies
are required in the new world oder
that are not predicated on the need to
respond to communism. Rather, these
policies must be reserved for truly
persecuted individuals. Purging the
present asylum system of abusers will
be a difficult task for policy makers. It
is past time, however, to remove the
element of subterfuge from what is
supposed to be a policy of refuge.
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REFUGEE-STATUS PROCEDURES AND THE BOAT PEOPLE
. Katharine Betts
Six hundred and fifty-two boat people,
316 of whom were Cambodians and
269 Chinese, arrived unannounced and
unauthorised in Australia between
November 1989 and October 1991.
Eventually, almost all applied for
refugee status. One hundred and forty
have been granted asylum and more
than 200 have returned home. 1 It is the
story of the remaining 300 which has
dominated the recent news about
immigration.
After exhaustive investigations
these 300 have been found not to be
refugees. But some have spent over
three years in detention waiting for the
authorities to reach this conclusion.
Many critics have been disturbed by
the practice of keeping them in
detention. Given the experience of
other western countries where asylum-
seekers vanish without trace into the
community (see the article by Vernon
Briggs in this issue), this policy is
defensible. But it does make the ques-
tions raised by the delay more urgent.
Why has it taken so long? Is the delay
the result of bureaucratic ineptitude?
Or was it caused by manipulative
lawyers conniving with the applicants
to draw out the process and buy more
time? (In this way they could say that
their clients must be allowed to stay
because the heartless bureaucrats have
made them wait so long.) Whose fault
is it'!
The procedures for assessing on-
shore applications for refugee status
have evolved rapidly between 1989
and 1993 in the face of a sharp in-
crease in numbers. (Few of these
growing numbers were boat people.
Most, though not all, were Chinese
nationals who had come in legally on
student visas.) In essence, the proced-
ures applied to the boat people were as
follows. They were first given 'com-
pliance interviews' by officers of the
Immigration Department to determine
their nationality, port of departure and
so forth. Then, after they had lodged
applications for refugee status they
were re-interviewed, again by officers
of the department. These officers, on
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